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PERSPECTIVES 
 
CHRISTOPHER W. HUGHES 
 
Japan’s Strategic Trajectory and Collective Self-Defense:  
Essential Continuity or Radical Shift? 
 
 
Abstract: The government of Abe Shinzō and various commentators tout Japan’s moves 
during 2014–15 to breach the ban on collective self-defense as moderation and continuity 
in postwar security policy.  This article unpacks the supposed limitations on exercise of 
the right and marks this as a watershed moment in Japan’s development of a radical 
security trajectory as an alliance and international security partner.  The changing 
international security environment and growing acceptance of the indivisibility of U.S.-
Japan security interests, coupled with hollow domestic legal, political, and bureaucratic 
constraints, heighten the likelihood Japan will use force to assist the United States. 
 
 
Throughout 2014 and 2015, Prime Minister Abe Shinzō invested major policy energy to advance 
a “limited” (gentei-teki yōnin) form of collective self-defense (shūdan-teki jieiken), a right Japan 
had denied itself the exercise of  since the mid-1950s.1  The Cabinet Decision of July 1, 2014, 
and the subsequent passage of extensive legislation in the National Diet in September 2015 now 
permit Japan for the first time in the postwar period and under “three new conditions” (san-
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shinjōken) to exercise force even if not itself directly under attack.2  Japan under Abe has shifted 
its postwar security policy: moving away from predicating its security stance upon 
interpretations of Article 9 of the 1947 constitution that permit only the exercise of the right of 
individual self-defense (kobetsu-teki jieiken) to now open up the option of de jure exercise of the 
right of collective self-defense.  These changes make possible enhanced military support for its 
alliance partner, the United States, and even third countries. 
 Abe’s initiatives attracted intense domestic and international attention as the legislation 
slowly wound its way through more than 200 hours of Diet deliberations during the summer of 
2015.  Most strikingly, the debates in the Diet were accompanied by large-scale demonstrations 
in the streets of Tokyo and nationwide not seen since the struggles over revision and extension of 
the U.S.-Japan security treaty in 1960 and 1970.3  Consequently, during and after the passage of 
the legislation, the exact significance of Japan’s shift regarding collective self-defense has 
remained highly contested.  For many policymakers and commentators in Japan and 
internationally, the 2014 Cabinet Decision and 2015 legislation represent essential continuity in 
Japanese security policy, and the overall significance of the reforms needs downplaying.  In his 
press conference on July 1, 2015, Abe blithely stated that: 
 
There are no changes in today’s Cabinet Decision from the basic way of thinking on 
constitutional interpretation to date.  Neither has the existing principle of not, as a general 
rule, permitting overseas deployment of the Self-Defense Forces changed in the slightest.  
It still remains the case that the Self-Defense Forces [SDF] will never participate in such 
warfare as the Gulf War or the Iraq War in the past.  There is a misunderstanding that 
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Japan will become caught up in wars in order to defend foreign countries.  In fact such a 
case is also entirely out of the question.4 (emphasis added) 
 
The Cabinet Office likewise projected an image of continuity by insisting there were no revisions 
of constitutional interpretations but instead a straightforward “rationalization” of unified 
government stances within existing interpretations (seifu kenkai no kihon-teki no ronri no 
wakunai ni okeru gōri-teki na atehame no kekka).5 
 Similarly, many policymakers and academic and media commentators view the Abe 
administration’s initiatives as within the pattern of moderate and incremental increases in Japan’s 
security trajectory over the postwar period.  The revised interpretations of Article 9 are seen to 
allow Japan to exercise a right already acknowledged or perhaps de facto exercised in the past.  
The new interpretations, they claim, represent only a “limited” exercise of collective self-defense 
with clear and even enhanced legal and political brakes, or hadome, that close off the option of 
the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) joining UN-mandated or U.S.-led contingencies and 
expeditions out of area.  They also claim that the exercise of collective self-defense will enhance 
deterrence and obviate the probable need for the use of force and, further, that revisions were 
made with transparency and in a democratic manner after prolonged Diet debate, arguably in 
contrast to past shifts in Japanese security policy.  The overall conclusion is that Abe’s reforms 
are proportionate, pose no real risk for regional or global security, and in fact are to be 
welcomed.  They are part of Abe’s campaign for a “proactive contribution to peace” (sekkyoku-
teki heiwashugi) and Japan’s rise to greater responsibilities within the U.S.-Japan alliance and as 
an international security partner.6  Other commentators, even if critical of the overall direction of 
Japan’s security reforms, argue that Abe’s insistence on the exercise of collective self-defense 
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may turn out to be more symbolic than substantive.  Abe’s moves are seen as revisionist 
posturing to restore Japan’s international status rather than a practical security option.  Faith is 
retained in the continuing constraints of domestic policy institutions and the public’s residual 
antimilitarism.7 
 On the other side of the debate stand Japanese opposition politicians, many legal scholars 
and academic analysts, large segments of the centrist and left-leaning media, protest groups 
(most notably, Student Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy), and at times East Asian 
neighbors and other international observers.  These critics argue that the Abe administration’s 
collective self-defense initiatives are a radical and disturbing departure from Japan’s postwar 
security trajectory.  Abe’s method to effect collective self-defense—opting for a reinterpretation 
of past government stances through a Cabinet Decision rather than formal revision of the 
constitution—was criticized as illegitimate by the then main opposition Democratic Party of 
Japan (DPJ), and opinion polls indicated that public concern revolved as much around Abe’s 
methods as the contents of the bills themselves.8  In terms of outcomes, Abe’s collective self-
defense measures have been viewed as a “slippery slope,” significantly loosening the restrictions 
on Japan’s use of military power for national security and expanding its potential to become 
embroiled in U.S.-led responses to security crises and operational contingencies.9  More 
emotively, the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) characterized the security legislation as 
a “war bill” (sensō hōan) and a revival of Japanese militarism.  The principal opposition parties 
have since maintained their resolve to repeal the legislation as unconstitutional and full of risk 
for Japan’s security.10 
 The debate over the impact of Abe’s collective self-defense reforms will rumble on, but 
given the intensity of this debate and the diverging predictions of continuity and radical change, 
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it is important to examine in greater depth the impact on Japan’s overall security trajectory.  
Japan’s security choices matter a great deal as its own citizens seek to determine whether 
postwar antimilitarism can be preserved or if a transition will be made to a so-called “normal” or 
genuine “proactive pacifism.”  They are also of great importance to the U.S.-Japan alliance as it 
seeks to upgrade bilateral cooperation to underpin the U.S. “rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific and to 
regional neighbors as they attempt to enhance security cooperation with Japan while watching 
with concern for signs of its possible remilitarization.  This essay seeks to engage many of the 
existing arguments concerning collective self-defense but at the same time to cut through 
divisions in the debate.  It offers a conclusion that Japan’s move toward the exercise of collective 
self-defense indeed opens pathways to radical shifts rather than maintaining continuity with the 
past security trajectory.  But these shifts will occur in phases and will be contingent on prevailing 
domestic and international political conditions. 
 More specifically, over the short term, those who have emphasized moderation and 
continuity may be correct that Abe and other Japanese administrations are likely to move with 
caution.  Japanese policymakers will remain concerned about public disquiet over additional 
security policy change and about the need to retain domestic electoral support.  Moreover, 
policymakers will continue hedging , or avoiding definite strategic choices, in order to obviate 
entrapment in U.S.-Japan alliance commitments and attempt to focus primarily on contingencies 
involving Japan and its region that might not necessitate collective self-defense at all but in 
which, if collective self-defense were required, it would be “limited” at most. 
 Over the medium to longer term, however, the Cabinet Decision and security legislation 
are likely to prove watershed moments in Japanese security policy.  Japan’s use of military 
power has traversed into a new field of action by changing emphasis from individual to 
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collective self-defense, thus making it harder to hedge and to opt out of U.S.-Japan alliance 
operations involving the use of force, possibly to assist other states.  Overall, then, Japan will 
move incrementally, and possibly at times in larger leaps, toward an expansion of its security 
role.  The expansion will be both functional, in terms of role, and geographical, in terms of 
regional and some global responsibilities, and now involves the use of force. 
 To make these arguments, this essay proceeds in two main sections.  The first considers 
the ramifications of lifting the ban on collective self-defense in the context of the international 
strategic drivers of security policy, particularly the imperatives of U.S.-Japan alliance 
cooperation.  It demonstrates that while Japan may maintain residual hedging and show 
reluctance to exercise collective self-defense, it will find this position progressively harder given 
pressure from the United States and other international security developments.  There is also 
emerging a new and increasing cognitive acceptance among Japanese policy elites of the 
necessity to exercise collective self-defense for national security.  The second section examines 
in detail the various legal, bureaucratic, and political conditions and constraints that have been 
argued domestically to define a robust, “limited” form of collective self-defense and to thereby 
limit the significance of Abe’s initiatives in this area.  It argues that the ability of Japanese 
policymakers to “hold the line” using these constraints is highly questionable, as in fact many of 
the constraints are so flexible and open to interpretation as to be potentially hollow in effect, thus 
opening the way for a more expansive and radical exercise of collective self-defense and military 
power in response to external strategic pressures. 
 
STRATEGIC DRIVERS AND DOMESTIC PRESSURES FOR  
COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE 
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 Japan in the postwar period has edged toward enabling collective self-defense due to the 
interplay of external security and domestic political influences.  It is arguably the former set of 
influences—as the international structure around Japan has been perceived to deteriorate and the 
U.S.-Japan alliance has evolved in response—that have been primarily and consistently 
responsible for setting the trajectory.  But moves toward collective self-defense have been 
mediated and generally resisted by Japanese policymakers.  Indeed, for much of the postwar 
period, Japan’s consideration of collective self-defense followed a consistent pattern.  When 
confronted by enhanced international security imperatives to expand alliance and external 
security commitments, and thus questions of entering into collective self-defense arrangements, 
policymakers responded by stretching existing constitutional interpretations and security policies 
and by incremental expansions of JSDF missions and roles.  Crucially, though, policymakers 
remained mindful of the need to minimize and hedge against the costs of external security 
commitments and, as a key component of these tactics, to refuse formal breaches of the ban on 
the exercise of collective self-defense.  Japan’s policy elites thus retained a strategic outlook that, 
in seeking to safeguard national autonomy, recognized Japanese and U.S. security interests were 
not always entirely congruent and might at times be distanced or even divisible, thus allowing for 
the need to maintain a degree of separation of security doctrines and military capabilities. 
 As this section demonstrates, though, in the post–cold war period, this pattern of Japanese 
policy came under increasing stress and has been largely broken under the Abe administration.  
The international structural, and especially alliance, pressures for a Japanese collective self-
defense commitment are now nearly inescapable.  Just as important, Japanese policymakers, 
increasingly swayed by their perceptions of the external security environment and the need to 
respond proactively, have shifted away from previous hedging strategies and the associated ban 
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on the exercise of collective self-defense.  The result is that international structural and domestic 
policymaking forces are now working in tandem to push Japan away from hedging and toward 
definite security commitments, specifically the need for collective self-defense, thus opening the 
way for major discontinuities in Japan’s security trajectory. 
 
 Hedging and the Nonexercise of Collective Self-Defense during the Cold War 
 Japan’s inherent rights of individual and collective self-defense under the UN Charter and 
its concomitant ability to enter into collective security arrangements were explicitly recognized 
in the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty of 1951 and in its revision, the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security of 1960.11  Nevertheless, for much of the cold war period, the United 
States failed to press Japan consistently or forcefully on collective self-defense.  In turn, 
Japanese leaders resolutely avoided the exercise of the right for fear of entrapment in U.S.-led 
military campaigns outside Japan’s immediate territory and security interests.  Prime Minister 
Yoshida Shigeru, in concluding the 1951 treaty and the Mutual Security Assistance Act of March 
1954, and thereby reluctantly accepting some measure of responsibility for Japan’s own defense 
and integration into the U.S. alliance strategy in East Asia, still determinedly resisted U.S. 
pressure to enter into any collective self-defense obligations.12  Indeed, in June 1954, shortly 
after the conclusion of the Mutual Security Assistance Act, the Yoshida administration issued the 
key Diet interpellation that the constitution prohibited the exercise of collective self-defense.13 
 Japan’s defense planners sensed increasing pressure for collective self-defense 
commitments in the 1960s and early 1970s as the United States sought enhanced military support 
from its East Asian allies to counter challenges to its strategic dominance in the region.  Japanese 
leaders maintained, though, minimalist military contributions and a refusal to breach 
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constitutional constraints.  Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, even while endorsing the so-called 
“mutual” nature of the revised treaty of 1960, ensured under the treaty’s Article 5 concerning the 
defense of Japan itself and U.S. forces deployed in its territory that any response to attacks would 
be in accordance with existing “constitutional provisions and processes.”  The new Article 6, 
concerned with “contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace 
and security in the Far East,” intimated support for the United States outside Japanese territory 
but made no mention of Japanese commitments beyond the provision of military bases.  
Moreover, the Kishi administration and powerful Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB) issued 
statements in the Diet reinforcing the position that Japan possessed the right of collective self-
defense but could not exercise it under the constitutional interpretations.  Subsequent Japanese 
administrations then steadfastly refused, in sharp contrast to other allies in East Asia, to be drawn 
into dispatching the JSDF to support the deepening U.S. war effort in Vietnam.14 
 Japan’s policymakers and the CLB sought to shut the door further on collective self-
defense in the run-up to the extension in perpetuity of the revised security treaty in 1970 and in 
the period surrounding the announcement of the “Nixon Doctrine” and negotiations for the 
reversion of Okinawa in 1971.  These events indicated Japan’s acquiescence in effectively 
locking itself long-term into the U.S. alliance system and enhanced U.S. expectations for 
Japanese and East Asian allies’ contributions to collective security arrangements, so raising the 
spectre of collective self-defense.  In October 1972, Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei’s 
government responded with a pivotal statement in the Diet further consolidating constitutional 
prohibitions.  Drawing on the constitution’s preamble, which proclaims “all people of the world 
have the right to live in peace,” and Article 13, which mandates that people’s “life, liberty, and 
the pursuit of happiness . . . shall be the supreme consideration . . . in . . . governmental affairs,” 
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the statement reiterated Japan’s possession under Article 9 of the right of self-defense, consisting 
of both individual and collective self-defense.  At the same time, the statement stressed that the 
right of self-defense was not limitless.  Japan’s exercise of self-defense should only be 
recognized in response to imminent unlawful situations where the people’s right to life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness is fundamentally overturned due to an armed attack by another state; 
and as an unavoidable step for safeguarding these rights; and when restricted to the minimum 
force necessary to repel these attacks.  Hence, the Tanaka cabinet reinforced the view that, while 
Japan possessed the rights of both individual and collective self-defense, it could only exercise 
the former as the latter would exceed the limits necessary for self-defense.15 
 Following the collapse of détente and the renewed rise of cold war tensions in the late 
1970s and 1980s, Japan’s policymakers again felt obliged to recalibrate assessments of the 
strategic environment and the necessary degree of security commitments to the United States.  
As the Soviet threat increased in East Asia as a whole and directly to Japan itself, leading to a 
fuller convergence of Japanese and U.S. security interests, so Japan ramped up bilateral security 
cooperation.  In line with the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation of 1978, Japan 
initiated discussions on bilateral cooperation that affected not just its own security directly, but 
also “in the case of situations in the Far East outside of Japan which will have an important 
influence on the security of Japan.”16  In May 1981, Prime Minister Suzuki Zenkō committed for 
the first time the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) under the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan 
Defense Cooperation to take responsibility for the sea lines of communication (SLOC) up to a 
range of 1,000 nautical miles and thus for a new security role outside Japan’s own territory.  
Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro’s administration then embarked on a buildup of JSDF 
capabilities to provide defensive support in and around its territory, thereby giving the United 
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States a freer hand to project power in the wider region.  Japan thus indicated that it would 
advance bilateral cooperation into Article 6–type operations, raising anew questions of collective 
self-defense operations. 
 However, in the very same month that it pledged the commitment to SLOC security and 
referred for the first time to the U.S.-Japan security arrangements as an “alliance,” Suzuki’s 
administration repeated that Japan possessed the right of collective self-defense but that its 
exercise would exceed the necessary limits for self-defense and was thus unconstitutional.17  The 
Nakasone administration also stuck rigidly to the line that any support the MSDF might provide 
for the defense of U.S. warships was for Japan’s own defense and thus in line with individual 
self-defense.18  Japanese administrations also devoted the majority of their efforts to in-depth 
studies of Article 5 bilateral cooperation, rather than Article 6 concerning regional contingencies 
that spelled the risk of entrapment.  Moreover, the fact that much of U.S.-Japan security 
cooperation was still concentrated around Japan itself meant that any overlap in bilateral 
cooperation between Article 5 and Article 6–type contingencies, and resultant questions over the 
exercise of collective self-defense, were elided given that Japanese capabilities and roles could 
be justified under the right of individual self-defense. 
 Regarding participation in UN-led collective security actions, as authorized by 
resolutions under Article 42 of the UN Charter rather than collective self-defense per se, 
Japanese administrations during the cold war period took a similarly consistent hedging stance.  
Japan argued that it was prepared to discharge its obligations to international society to the extent 
that these did not conflict with or exceed the constitution as the supreme law of the state.  The 
Japanese government stressed that as Article 9 of the constitution prohibits the use of force for 
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settling international disputes, then participation in collective security activities entailing the use 
of force was also prohibited. 
 
 Japan’s Post–Cold War Shift to the Necessity of Collective Self-Defense 
 Japanese policymakers’ consistent preference and ability via constitutional artifices to 
resist and hedge against the exercise of collective self-defense has come under increasing 
pressure in the post–cold war period.  Japan’s exposure to an apparently deteriorating security 
environment—manifested in the Asia-Pacific by North Korea’s nuclearization and the rise of 
China, and globally by the challenges of the Gulf War of 1990–91 and the conflicts ensuing from 
9/11 in Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 2000s—has pushed to the forefront questions of how it 
should actively support the United States and the exercise of collective self-defense. 
 In East Asia, following the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1994, the Taiwan Strait crisis 
of 1995–96, and the alliance’s revealed lack of preparedness to respond to regional 
contingencies, the United States focused on strengthening Article 6–type bilateral cooperation.19  
Japan moved in this direction by revising the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation in 
1996–97 and passing the Regional Contingencies Law in 1999, which specified for the first time 
the noncombat logistical support the JSDF could provide the United States in Article 6–type 
situations under the security treaty.20  Japanese administrations, though, continued to hedge 
strongly their national security commitments and were able to insist that, despite this expanded 
scope of U.S.-Japan security cooperation, there was no breach of the prohibition on, or 
compulsion to, exercise collective self-defense.  Japanese support for the United States would be 
justified as having “an important influence on Japan’s peace and security,” conducted outside 
combat zones, and most crucially would not involve the use of force. 
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 In the case of global contingencies, Japan’s expectation has increasingly been that it 
should demonstrate proactive support for its ally by now stretching its security role out-of-area.  
Japanese government policymakers and elements of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) were 
intent on dispatching the JSDF to support the UN-mandated operations of the Gulf War in 1990–
91 but were frustrated by constitutional interpretations that held such dispatch exceeded the 
scope of self-defense.  The eventual dispatch of MSDF minesweepers in 1991 was made possible 
only because it occurred in peacetime after the cessation of hostilities and thus did not clash with 
constitutional prohibitions.  The failure to engage in the collective international military response 
during the Gulf War induced a sense of national humiliation among policymakers that triggered a 
search for means of dispatching the JSDF overseas in the future as a contribution to international 
security. 
 Japan was then able to effect the first overseas dispatch of the JSDF in UN-legitimated 
operations with the passage of the International Peace Cooperation Law (IPCL) of June 1992.  
The IPCL, though, only mandated participation in UN-centered peacekeeping operations (PKO) 
during peacetime and chiefly in logistical and reconstruction activities.  The JSDF was permitted 
to use force solely for defense of its own personnel and for protecting those under its control.  
However, the JSDF was not permitted to come to the defense of a geographically distant unit or 
of personnel from other states (kaketsuke keigo) involved in the same UN PKO, nor to use force 
to remove obstructions to its mission, thus ruling out both collective security and collective self-
defense. 
 Japan’s next ventures into dispatching the JSDF overseas to support the United States and 
to expand the range and scope of the alliance came in the “war on terror” in Afghanistan and 
then the postwar reconstruction of Iraq.  In order to dispatch the MSDF and Air Self-Defense 
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Force (ASDF) to the Indian Ocean area between 2001 and 2010 to provide logistical refueling 
support to U.S. and other coalition forces involved in the campaign in Afghanistan, Japanese 
policymakers put in place the 2001 Antiterrorism Special Law.  The law provided a legal 
framework for JSDF dispatch by making use of extant UN resolutions and then bridging these to 
the constitution’s preamble and Japan’s obligations to maintain an “honored place in 
international society.”  Hence, JSDF dispatch could be initiated without invoking individual or 
collective self-defense but using instead a form of quasi-collective security.  Japanese 
policymakers then used a similarly ingenious artifice to enable Ground Self-Defense Force 
(GSDF) and ASDF dispatch to Iraq between 2004 and 2008 for logistical support and 
reconstruction missions, again predicating the 2001 Iraqi Reconstruction Law on UN resolutions 
and linking to the preamble of the constitution.21 
 Japan was thus able to exercise something akin to de facto collective security in both 
Afghanistan and Iraq, but by stretching interpretations rather than by complete reinterpretation, 
and still with considerable hedging against the types of operations permitted for the JSDF.  Most 
significantly, once again, the missions were noncombat in nature and did not involve the use of 
force, avoiding the issue of collective self-defense. 
 Nonetheless, as the Asia-Pacific security environment continues to transform and 
impinge ever more strongly on Japan’s security interests in the second decade of the twenty-first 
century, and as the United States seeks to strengthen bilateral cooperation in response to these 
challenges, motivations to maintain hedging tactics in relation to alliance commitments have 
declined among Japanese policymakers.  The prohibitions on the exercise of collective self-
defense have concomitantly weakened.  Japan’s decision since 2003 to introduce ballistic missile 
defense (BMD) systems—consisting of the completed deployment by 2010 of the ASDF’s 
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Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) system, and the upgrading and testing from 2007 onward 
of the MSDF Aegis destroyer Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) BLK-IIA system—has been one 
particularly persistent driver for reinterpreting the prohibition on collective self-defense.  For the 
effective operation of BMD, Japan and the United States require the increasing integration of 
bilateral information sharing and command and control; the MSDF Aegis system in particular 
offers new possibilities for U.S.-Japan mutual defense operations.  Japan’s Aegis system is 
highly interoperable with that of the United States, sharing as it does essentially the same 
capabilities in sensor technology, data linking, and the codeveloped SM-3 BLK-IIA missile.  The 
MSDF Aegis sea-based system is inherently mobile and deployable alongside U.S. Navy assets 
whether in and around Japan or in other waters, thus raising the possibility that the United States 
will request Japanese BMD support in a variety of contingencies outside the traditional scope of 
the security treaty.  Japan’s defense planners denied initially that BMD carried implications for 
breaching the ban on collective self-defense, but their U.S. counterparts consistently and publicly 
stressed that the technological and strategic logic was for the system to work effectively for the 
alliance and for Japan to exercise the right.22 
 Beyond BMD, many policymakers have increasingly accepted that—in the face of 
China’s relentless rise, Sino-Japanese tensions over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islets and 
maritime security, and concerns over the strength of the U.S. strategic commitment to the 
region—Japan needs to solidify alliance cooperation and now obviate risks of abandonment 
rather than fearing entrapment.  In turn, these policymakers, especially in the LDP, have 
concluded that to demonstrate support for efforts such as the U.S. “rebalance” to the region, 
Japan should be prepared to involve itself in expanded alliance operations that may include the 
exercise of collective self-defense.  The LDP is increasingly dominated by Abe and other key 
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party figures such as Ishiba Shigeru who strongly advocate the exercise of collective self-
defense, while the moderate security pragmatists in the Yoshida tradition have been increasingly 
marginalized within the party.23 
 Even the DPJ, the main opposition party for most of the last two decades and even during 
its period in government from 2009 to 2012, was not averse to moves toward collective self-
defense or collective security; the party only really hardened its objections to collective self-
defense after Abe took power.  The right wing of the party, including figures such as Prime 
Minister Noda Yoshihiko, and security specialists Maehara Seiji and Nagashima Akihisa were 
personally sympathetic to collective self-defense.  Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio in his own 
draft for constitutional revision in 2005 had advocated a “limited” form of collective self-defense 
centered on cooperation with international institutions.  Diet member Ozawa Ichirō and Prime 
Minister Kan Naoto favored a form of collective security under UN mandates.24 
 Japanese policymakers have been encouraged in these moves by influential “Japan 
handlers” in the United States who have generated a bipartisan consensus that Japan should lift 
its ban on collective self-defense, as it is an undue constraint on alliance cooperation and more 
equal security partnership, especially in regard to BMD and regional contingencies.25  President 
Barack Obama during his joint press conference with Abe in Tokyo in April 2014 ventured 
further, reportedly welcoming Japanese moves toward collective self-defense.26 
 In thinking through the future course of collective self-defense, Japan’s most influential 
policymakers also demonstrate, arguably beyond just rhetoric, fundamental shifts in their 
strategic assumptions relating to security cooperation.  As noted above, Japanese leaders from 
Yoshida onward sought to avoid external commitments by arguing those were essentially outside 
their state’s own security interests.  Japan’s ready ability to depend on U.S. security guarantees 
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for much of the cold war allowed it to separate efforts for national security and broader regional 
security.  However, Japan’s new National Security Strategy (NSS), released in December 2013, 
indicated a shift in views.  The NSS posited that the changing balance of power in the Asia-
Pacific, the rise of China, and the advancement of globalization and technological innovation 
meant “threats, irrespective of where they originate in the world, could instantly have a direct 
influence on the security of Japan” (kyoi ga, sekai no dono chiiki ni oite hassei shite mo, shunji 
ni chikyū ni mawari, wagakuni no anzen hoshō ni mo chokusetu eikyō o oyoboshieru jōkyō).  
Consequently, it asserted that “Japan cannot secure its own peace and security by itself” 
(wagakuni no heiwa to anzen wa wagakuni ikkoku de wa kakuho dekizu).  The NSS issued a 
clear challenge to Japan’s supposed postwar “one-country pacifism” (ikkoku heiwashugi) and 
proposed instead Abe’s “proactive contribution to peace” or “proactive pacifism.”27 
 Abe’s Advisory Panel on the Reconstruction for the Legal Basis of Security was 
convened during his first administration, deliberated from 2006 to 2008, and was reconvened in 
2013–14.  It produced reports in 2008 and 2014 advocating the exercise of collective self-
defense.  Although Abe clearly packed the panel with experts who shared his view of security, its 
findings further demonstrate a new acceptance that Japan’s need to undertake greater 
international security responsibilities was at the core of its own national security interests.28  The 
Advisory Panel’s two reports emphasized Japan’s obligation to exercise the right of self-defense 
and that this encompassed the possession of the rights of both individual and collective self-
defense.  It acknowledged that Japan had hitherto considered the exercise only of the right of 
individual self-defense as sufficient and legitimate for the purpose of self-defense.  But the panel 
argued that in the twenty-first century many diverse security threats had emerged, exacerbated in 
reach and impact by advances in military technology.  This meant no nation could any longer 
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defend itself entirely alone and international collective responses were increasingly demanded.  
In Japan’s case, this new security environment necessitates the exercise of both collective self-
defense and collective security.  The panel advocated a range of scenarios for the exercise of 
these security options, including: MSDF defense of U.S. warships engaged in joint exercises and 
interdiction of shipping in international waters; MSDF utilization of BMD to intercept missile 
attacks on the United States itself and U.S. assets: GSDF defense of the militaries (kaketsuke 
keigo) of other states engaged in UN PKO; MSDF minesweeping in maritime areas such as the 
Strait of Hormuz; and JSDF participation in UN-mandated operations such as the 1990–91 Gulf 
War.29 
 Hence, in accepting the indivisibility of Japan’s security from that of the rest of region 
and arguing for participation in collective security arrangements, the Advisory Panel reports 
exhibited a sea change in Japanese strategic thinking.  Abe subsequently utilized the Advisory 
Panel’s reports to justify moving toward breaching the ban on collective self-defense.  During 
the press conference on May 15, 2014, announcing the second report, and then in July in 
confirming the Cabinet Decision on collective self-defense, the prime minister repeated the logic 
that Japan could no longer defend itself alone or by depending on the United States; Japan 
needed to meet emerging threats collectively.30  Abe’s acceptance of this logic and his concept of 
a “proactive contribution to international peace” in order to counter these threats did not yet 
signal an absolute shift away from past Japanese strategic thinking.  The prime minister still 
rejected collective security as an option that likely exceeded the purport of the constitution and 
thus stated that the “JSDF will never participate in such warfare as the Gulf War or Iraq War for 
the purpose of the use of force.”31  As noted earlier, Abe also asserted that there would only be a 
“limited acceptance” rather than total lifting of the ban (zenmen kaikin) on the exercise of 
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collective self-defense.  Abe’s own thinking, nonetheless, again demonstrated a significant 
change in the postwar Japanese mind-set of avoiding external security commitments.  The 
administration then demonstrated the seriousness of its intent by initiating a full political process 
for reinterpreting the prohibition on the exercise of collective self-defense a related and 
substantive reorientation of U.S.-Japan alliance cooperation, and legislation to facilitate these 
changes. 
 Following intensive negotiations within the LDP-New Kōmeitō coalition during May and 
June 2014, agreement was reached on principles for the July Cabinet Decision on breaching the 
ban on collective self-defense.  The coalition parties engineered this agreement by tracking back 
to the Tanaka administration’s 1972 statement on collective self-defense that had served as the 
main prohibition on exercise of the right.  The coalition reinterpreted the statement to stress that 
not only did Japan possess the rights of individual and collective self-defense, but that it could 
now exercise the latter without exceeding the minimum use of force necessary for self-defense.  
Drawing on the logic of the Advisory Panel, the coalition partners agreed that Japan’s security 
environment and modern warfare technology had been fundamentally transformed, meaning that 
even an attack on another state could threaten Japan’s survival.  The exercise of collective self-
defense for the overriding objective of national self-defense thus became both necessary and 
acceptable.  The Cabinet Decision, drawing on the language of the NSS and the Advisory Panel, 
reiterated this new security logic: 
 
When considering only the quarter-century since the end of the Cold War, the shift in the 
global power balance, rapid progress of technological innovation, development and 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and threats such as 
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international terrorism have given rise to issues and tensions in the Asia-Pacific region, 
there exists a situation in which any threats, irrespective of where they originate in the 
world, could have a direct influence on the security of Japan [kyoi ga sekai no dono 
chiiki ni oite hassei shite mo, wagakuni no anzen hoshō ni eikyō oyoboshieru jōkyō]. . . . 
No country can secure its own peace only by itself [mohaya, dono kuni mo ikkoku nomi 
de heiwa o mamoru koto wa dekizu], and the international community also expects Japan 
to play a more proactive role for peace and stability in the world, in a way commensurate 
with its national capability.32 
 
As seen in the next section, the LDP and New Kōmeitō stress that any decision by Japan to 
exercise collective self-defense is governed by a range of new conditions and constraints derived 
from the 1972 statement.  But the coalition still performed an extraordinary volte face in 
adapting the statement prohibiting collective self-defense to one enabling that same right. 
 The Abe administration’s determination regarding collective self-defense was further 
demonstrated by the fact that it did not stop with the Cabinet Decision’s enunciation of the 
principles.  It took swift action to create substantive operational and legal frameworks for the 
exercise of the right in advance of passing the enabling legislation.  The Guidelines for U.S.-
Japan Defense Cooperation were revised in April 2015, the first such revision since 1997, 
specifically to facilitate collective self-defense operations, denoted as situations in which Japan 
would be called upon “to respond to an armed attack against the United States or a third country, 
and Japan has not come under attack.”  The scope of Japanese support for the United States in 
contingencies, including collective self-defense situations, has been broadened from previous 
iterations to now involve BMD, search and rescue, logistics support, and maritime operations 
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such as minesweeping, escort protection, and interdiction.  Moreover, bilateral cooperation is no 
longer necessarily restricted geographically and is instead emphasized as global in scope, so 
aiming for seamless (kireme no nai) interoperability of the U.S.-Japan alliance. 33  The passage 
through the Diet in September 2015 of the collective self-defense legislation, encountering 
strong resistance in the Diet itself and intense public scrutiny and often protest within broader 
society, demonstrated the resolve of the coalition to effect collective self-defense despite the 
political risks. 
 Japan under the Abe administration has thus moved a significant, and arguably 
increasingly decisive, distance toward making collective self-defense a reality.  Japan’s changing 
security environment and the consequent enhanced expectations for U.S.-Japan alliance 
cooperation have generated ever-stronger drivers for external and collective self-defense 
commitments.  In turn, the strategic mindset of Japan’s policymakers has undergone a 
progressive shift and now accepts the near indivisibility of U.S. and Japanese security interests 
and the concomitant need to cease utilizing constitutional prohibitions to hedge security 
commitments.  Finally, the Abe administration’s new legislation and its revision of the 
Guidelines for U.S.-Japanese Defense Cooperation have provided ready frameworks for the 
military operationalization and actual exercise of collective self-defense.  This offers a powerful 
set of impulses to Japanese policymakers seeking to determine security preferences.  In this 
context, we need to question the claims of the Abe administration that the move toward the 
exercise of collective self-defense represents continuity and that the constraints on its actual use 
remain dominant. 
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THE JAPAN THAT REALLY CAN SAY “NO”?: 
HOLDING THE LINE ON “LIMITED” COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE 
 Abe administration officials and other proponents of the recent reinterpretation of 
constitutional prohibitions and new collective self-defense legislation have offered a series of 
justifications for why these moves represent essential continuity rather than a radical shift.  
These generally revolve around the arguments that they have consciously and skillfully 
calibrated any changes in such a way as to attenuate strategic risks and that additional 
constitutional breakwaters are built into the new legislation.  Japan is thus seen as continuing to 
rely on its ability to hedge and moderate its security commitments and to hold back the tide of 
external and domestic forces pushing for collective self-defense. 
 The first argument used to support the claim that Japan’s stance on collective self-defense 
is limited is that this expanded range of national security options enhances U.S.-Japan 
cooperation and thus deterrence.  The ability to exercise collective self-defense thereby serves to 
enhance also regional stability and to head off and lessen the risks of conflict and Japanese 
entrapment.  Abe in his May 15, 2014, press conference propounded this thesis: 
 
Some argue that our discussion on the right of collective self-defense will result in Japan 
becoming embroiled in the wars of other countries [takoku no sensō ni makikomareru].  
There appeared to be a rise of such arguments at the time of the Japan-U.S. Security 
Treaty revision in the 1960s.  However, the focus of the opposition was against the 
possibility of Japan becoming embroiled in the wars of other countries, rather than the 
revision of the Treaty itself.  Many repeatedly argued that Japan would find itself caught 
in wars if the Treaty was revised, but after 50 years, has it ever caused a problem?  It is 
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now commonly understood by Japanese people that the revision of the Japan-U.S. 
Security Treaty instead enhanced the deterrence capacity of the Japan, and the presence 
of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific region has helped establish peace more firmly in the 
region.  What we are trying to do is in fact to further enhance Japan’s deterrence capacity 
[yokushiryoku ga takamari], and we must discuss this matter further with a determination 
to do everything we can to protect the lives of the Japanese people.34 
 
The Cabinet Decision repeated this line: 
 
It is essential to avoid armed conflicts before they materialize [buryokyu funsō o mizen ni 
kaihi] and prevent threats from reaching Japan by further elevating the effectiveness of 
the Japan-United States security arrangements and enhancing the deterrence of the Japan-
United States Alliance for the security of Japan and peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific 
region.  On that basis, in order to resolutely secure the lives and peaceful livelihood of its 
people under any situation and contribute even more proactively to the peace and stability 
of the international community under the policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” 
based on the principle of international cooperation, it is necessary to develop domestic 
legislation that enables seamless responses.35 
 
Abe once again used this argument immediately after the passage of the legislation through the 
Diet in September 2015: 
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We need to think of ways we can pass on a peaceful Japan to our children.  Making 
robust preparations enabling us to seamlessly respond to any situation, ensuring that the 
Japan-U.S. Alliance fully functions in the situation that Japan finds itself threatened, and 
clearly demonstrating this to the work, and pre-emptively preventing war to ensure 
regional peace and stability—these are the core issues the Legislation for Peace and 
Security addresses.36 
 
 The second line of argument employed to support claims of continuity and moderation, 
and limited risks of involvement in conflict, has stressed collective self-defense as a “right” 
rather than an “obligation,” meaning that Japan can reserve the option not to exercise the right 
based on policy judgment and necessity.  The Advisory Panel first used this argument in its 2014 
report stating that: 
 
Although there is some debate about Japan being drawn into endless wars engaged in by 
the United States if the right of collective self-defense were to be permitted, given that 
the right of collective self-defense is in the first place a right and not an obligation [gimu 
de wa naku kenri de aru], the exercise of the right is ultimately an issue for Japan to 
determine on its own initiative [wagakuni ga shutai-teki ni handan subeki].37 
 
 The LDP-New Kōmeitō coalition adopted this as the official administration stance 
(shūdan-teki jieiken no kōshi wa “kenri” de ari “gimu” de wa nai) in its initial question-and-
answer (Q&A) document supporting the announcement of the Cabinet Decision in 2014.38  The 
stance of Japanese policymakers implies, then, not only that collective self-defense staves off the 
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risk of embroilment in conflict through enhanced deterrence but also that Japan retains complete 
strategic autonomy to decide its security commitments if presented with a contingency, even in 
the face of alliance pressures from the United States. 
 In turn, the proponents of collective self-defense point to the “three new conditions,” 
extracted from the reinterpretation of the 1972 Tanaka cabinet statement, as the most significant 
of the constraints (hadome) on the exercise of the right.  The use of force should meet the 
following conditions: 
 
1. When an armed attack against Japan occurs or when an armed attack against a foreign 
country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s 
survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty 
and the pursuit of happiness 
2. When there is no other appropriate means to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s 
survival and protect its people 
3. Use of force should be limited to the minimum extent necessary.39 
 
The New Komeitō felt it had further tightened up the conditions by insisting in the May-June 
2014 coalition negotiations that the original wording in the first condition of “other country” 
(takoku) should be replaced with “a country in a close relationship” (kinmitsu no kankei ni aru 
takoku) with Japan.  The party was seeking to foreclose the possibility that the JSDF might be 
dispatched to assist any country of any region, making it more likely that force would only be 
used to assist the United States and other close security partners.  It also felt it had raised the 
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threshold for justifying the use of force by switching the original wording from simply “fear” 
(osore) of threat to posing a “clear danger” (meihaku na kiken).40 
 In terms of formal constraints, the case is further made that Japan can only exercise 
collective self-defense in line with Article 9, Clause 4, of the Law on Response to Contingencies 
that requires Diet approval for the mobilization of the JSDF.  The law states that in “emergency” 
(kinkyū) situations, prior Diet approval for mobilization may not be required, only postapproval.  
But the government stresses that, “as a principle, prior Diet approval is necessary” (gensoku 
Kokkai no jizen shonin o yō suru).41  Moreover, the LDP-New Komeitō coalition as part of its 
effort to secure broader national approval for the final passage of the legislation in the upper 
house acceded to additional demands from the Assembly to Energize Japan, the New 
Renaissance Party, and the Party for Future Generations (renamed the Party for Kokoro in late 
2015).  The five parties agreed that JSDF dispatch for collective self-defense operations—
necessary for national survival but not resulting from armed attack such as dispatch to the 
Persian Gulf to respond to interruptions to Japan’s oil supplies—should require prior Diet 
approval “without exception” (reigai naku jizen shonin).  In addition, the parties agreed that the 
government should report to the Diet on JSDF activities within 180 days of dispatch.42  Abe was 
thus able in his September 25, 2015, press conference, following passage of the legislation with 
the support of the five parties, to claim triumphantly that his government had imposed additional 
constraints on the exercise of collective self-defense: 
 
The agreement was predicated on the strengthening of democratic controls over the 
mobilisation of the Self Defense Forces, including the requirement of prior Diet approval.  
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This is a framework in which a democratically elected government makes its decision 
with the comprehensive involvement of the parliament.43 
 
 Overall, therefore, the Abe administration and others arguing that collective self-defense 
represents essential continuity in security policy have sought to claim that, despite the political 
upheavals generated by the reinterpretation and passage of legislation, Japan has in fact 
strengthened its defense and alliance posture to minimize the risks of involvement in conflict.  
They argue that Japan has retained strategic autonomy over defense commitments and has put in 
place legal and parliamentary brakes enabling it to opt out of exercising the right.  The 
coalition’s Q&A document summed up its confidence in this position: 
 
The “three new conditions” provide clear constitutional brakes [kenpōjō no meikaku na 
hadome].  In addition, the bills demand Diet approval for the use of force. . . . Whether 
the “three new conditions” are met will be decided objectively and rationally. . . . In the 
event a request is received from the United States to participate in a war, would we be 
able to refuse? . . . If the three new conditions are not fulfilled, then naturally the 
response would be “we cannot” [“dekinai” to kotaeru no wa tōzen]). . . . Deterrence 
power is strengthening. . . . The risk of Japan’s embroilment in war is decreasing. 44 
 
 Moreover, rising political barriers generated from the debates over the security legislation 
are seen by some to suggest that Japan’s possible exercise of collective self-defense is highly 
circumscribed.  The LDP is seen as increasingly wary of alienating the New Kōmeitō, thus 
limiting further security reforms, and as having stimulated public opinion to oppose even more 
28 
 
 
strongly changes in Japan’s security posture.  In this way, Abe is seen, ironically, as having 
raised the domestic barriers to Japan’s exercise of collective self-defense and having constrained 
the government’s room to maneuver in the future by establishing explicit hadome, whereas in the 
past it had to rely on stretching the constitution to effect its security agenda, and thus with the 
introduction of new legislation scored something of a Pyrrhic victory.45 
 
JAPAN’S TOOTHLESS HADOME AND ENTRAPMENT 
 Japanese policymakers thus posit a set of seemingly compelling strategic, legal, and 
political constraints on collective self-defense, insuring continuity and moderation.  However, if 
these supposed constraints are scrutinized closely, there are grounds for questioning whether 
they serve as brakes at all.  It is arguable that the so-called constraints increase the probability of 
Japan’s failing to retain strategic autonomy and hedging options, and that, in the longer term, 
they enhance the freedom of action of the Japanese government to exercise collective self-
defense. 
 
 Enhanced Deterrence as Enhanced Entrapment 
 The first argument of advocates for collective self-defense—that it offers strengthened 
deterrence thus obviating conflict and decreasing the likelihood of the nonexercise of the right—
can be challenged by its own internal logic, rendering the argument at least moot or even 
falsifiable.  In order to make deterrence function, Japan needs to demonstrate very clearly both to 
potential adversaries such as China and North Korea and to its U.S. ally and other potential 
security partners its degree of preparedness and the parameters for its use of military force.  If 
Japan remains ambiguous in its determination to dissuade an adversary from a particular course 
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of action through force and retaliation, then conflict cannot be obviated through the threat of 
deterrence.  Japanese policymakers thus cannot stop at the level of declaratory rhetoric or 
creating legal frameworks—as they attempted to do during the Diet debates in 2015 when they 
avoided discussion of specific threats from other states and preferred instead to talk of general 
scenarios.  Instead, policymakers have to move Japanese and U.S. strategic and operational 
planning to a higher and more specific level than ever before.46  Recognition of this need to shift 
radically the terms of the alliance is evident from the revised functional and geographical scope 
of the 2015 revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. 
 Japanese policymakers’ attempts to strengthen the deterrence of the U.S.-Japan alliance 
mean that the past pattern of hedging strategic intentions becomes progressively more difficult, 
and this has mixed ramifications.  Japan’s declining hedging strategy and its hopes for enhanced 
deterrence might work to obviate conflict but carry the implication that Japan in the first instance 
has to be prepared to commit itself to fighting alongside the United States, with the potentially 
enhanced risks of direct entrapment in contingencies if deterrence fails.47  Japanese policymakers 
may calculate that these risks are worth taking for the potential payoff of obviating conflict.  But 
even if the public were to accept the logic that collective self-defense diminishes the risk of 
embroilment in U.S.-led conflicts, it remains the case that any miscalculation resulting from this 
policy shift might impose a drastically higher degree of the impact of those risks.  These risks 
and costs, which were consistently avoided by Japan’s past pattern of hedging behavior, are 
much higher than acknowledged in current government reassurances. 
 Moreover, for other commentators, Japan’s move to enable the exercise of collective self-
defense contains a logic that cuts against any argument for obviating conflict through deterrence.  
The expansion of U.S.-Japan alliance cooperation fostered by collective self-defense and the 
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revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation is viewed by some as only increasing 
general security dilemmas and regional tensions and also the possibility of dragging Japan into a 
regional conflict involving the United States and China or North Korea.48 
 If moves to enable the exercise of collective self-defense might actually enhance rather 
than reduce the risk of Japan’s embroilment in conflict, then arguments against government 
propositions that Japan retains strategic autonomy to choose not to exercise the right and to stay 
out of conflicts come into play.  In breaching the ban on collective self-defense, Japan has clearly 
opened up new military horizons for the use of force even when not itself under direct attack, 
options that were previously denied it by constitutional interpretations.  This presents Japan with 
an unprecedented set of strategic choices.  For Japanese policymakers and the citizenry, the 
terms of the debate and response to U.S. requests for military assistance have now fundamentally 
changed. 
 As one scholar notes, in line with holding to the right of individual self-defense, Japan 
was in the past able to respond to U.S. and international requests for military assistance in 
contingencies with “sorry but cannot” (zannen da ga dekinai).  However, if it wants to remove 
itself from providing assistance, Japan now has to shift to a position of “can but will not” (dekiru 
kedo, shinai).49  Japan’s ability to assert this new stance in the face of U.S. and international 
pressure might not be tenable.  Japan has in past contingencies not shown itself to be adept at 
issuing outright refusals to U.S. requests for military assistance.  Indeed, it has only been able to 
limit the JSDF to noncombat roles precisely because it could draw on the justification of the 
nonexercise of collective self-defense.  Japanese policymakers were able to make this argument 
in the 1990–91 Gulf War, in the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis, in the aftermath of 9/11 and 
the conflict in Afghanistan, and following the Iraq War.  Deprived now of the constitutional 
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firewall of individual self-defense and equipped with the new explicit facility to exercise 
collective self-defense, it is doubtful whether Japan really could refuse, or would even want to 
refuse, U.S. requests and retain its previous strategic autonomy with the utter confidence that 
Abe’s government asserts. 
 
 Conditionless “Three New Conditions” 
 Moving to the “three new conditions,” the centerpiece of Japanese government legal 
claims that collective self-defense is highly circumscribed, it must be asked whether these are 
“new,” or even “conditions” at all.  It is striking that the government offers no objective criteria 
to define the first condition—the threat to Japan’s survival must be sufficient to trigger the 
exercise of the right—thus leaving ample room to pursue its own interpretations and policy 
objectives.  The Abe administration’s sample scenarios for collective self-defense have focused 
predominantly on responses to military contingencies in Japan’s surrounding region.  During 
Diet debates, though, Abe consistently referred to the possibility of an interruption to Japan’s oil 
supplies via the Persian Gulf necessitating the dispatch of JSDF on minesweeping duties to the 
Strait of Hormuz, thereby raising questions among opposition politicians as to whether economic 
motivations alone could justify collective self-defense. 50  As noted above, the five-party 
agreement in the upper house in September 2015 considered such economic-oriented dispatches 
legitimate when it came to requiring prior Diet approval, thus confirming the critique of other 
opposition parties.  The Abe administration in the end settled on a process whereby the criteria 
for the first new condition would be decided by the cabinet’s “overall judgment” (sōgō-teki ni 
handan suru)—another entirely vague formulation leaving room for wide interpretation by the 
executive.51 
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 The second condition, that collective self-defense can be exercised only where there are 
no other appropriate means of responding to an armed attack, is similarly vague and open to 
executive interpretation.  Abe’s government again offered no objective criteria for the triggering 
of this condition, leaving commentators to opine that in a real conflict this condition may not be 
decided by Japan autonomously but under pressure from the United States.  If the United States 
were involved in a military conflict or was itself subject to military attack, it would likely request 
the necessary military support from its ally, and Japan would find itself hard-pressed to refuse 
the dispatch of the JSDF or to argue that it instead preferred, for instance, the use of economic 
sanctions.  It seems farfetched in the context of alliance relations that Japan—which is now 
equipped with a new legal capability to exercise collective self-defense and has an 
accompanying operational blueprint via the revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense 
Cooperation—would refuse to exercise that right in a military conflict involving attacks on the 
United States or would push instead for a nonmilitary response. 
 Regarding the third new condition, adhering to the minimum force necessary, the Abe 
government proffers no objective definitions or restrictions on the exercise of collective self-
defense.  Abe did indicate during responses to persistent opposition questioning in the Diet in 
May and August 2015 that the government envisaged the use of minimum of force to mean that 
the JSDF under collective self-defense would not “generally” be dispatched (ippan-teki ni kaigai 
hahei mitomerarete inai) in support of U.S. operations in the territory of neighboring states.  
Indeed, most of the sample scenarios put forward by the coalition focused on maritime 
operations.52  Abe followed on, arguing that in the case of a ballistic missile attack on the United 
States originating from an unspecified foreign country, Japan could provide military assistance 
through the deployment of BMD systems at sea.  Abe thus indicated that any use of military 
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force involving dispatch to that foreign country’s territory would be unlikely because it would go 
beyond the minimum force necessary to remove threats.  When pressed even further, Abe stated 
that Japan would be prevented under this third condition from dispatching the JSDF to the land, 
sea, or airspace of South Korea in response to contingencies.53 
 Abe appeared to be indicating some limitations on force imposed by this third condition, 
but the lack of specificity beyond this, as well as past government interpellations around the use 
of force, cast doubt on how fixed these are and indicate Japan may find it impossible to delimit 
JSDF use of force to within its own territory or surrounding international air and sea space.54  For 
instance, in the case of the use of force against foreign countries to counter missile attacks, the 
Japanese government has since 1956, even under the right of individual self-defense, reserved 
the capability to strike at enemy missile bases if they threaten Japan’s security.55  Minister of 
Defense Nakatani Gen, just two days after Abe denied the likelihood of the JSDF being 
dispatched to foreign territory under collective self-defense, stated in a press conference that, “if 
the use of force on the territory of another state fits with the ‘three new conditions,’ then it is not 
disallowed by the constitution.”  Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide noted in his press 
conference the following week that “there are National Diet pronouncements that make possible 
striking at enemy guided missile bases.”56 
 Hence, these precedents established under even more restrictive past constitutional 
interpretations and legal regimes, combined with the refusal of the administration to specify 
criteria for the minimum force necessary, make it highly probable that Japan could pursue a very 
expansive definition of collective self-defense.  This definition would most likely allow the use 
of force against and within third countries in response to attacks on the United States.  Finally, 
on this third condition, commentators have noted that, just like the first two, it is not a “new” 
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condition, having been in place since 1972, and it is not particular or restrictive to Japan given 
that all countries claim to use the minimum force necessary as part of “just war” theory.57 
 The Abe administration’s claims about the strength of hadome thus appear highly 
questionable due to their inherent flexible interpretation and the likelihood of their coming under 
severe stress in contingency situations, thus opening the way for Japan’s use of force.  In this 
way, the administration’s talk of breaching the ban on the exercise of collective self-defense 
while retaining full strategic autonomy appears less than convincing.  Opening up this right 
could instead result in the obligation to exercise it in a conflict.  Moreover, the other legal and 
political constraints appear just as flexible and vulnerable to fail in the face of strategic and 
government imperatives. 
 
 Lowering Constraints on Executive Control 
 The requirement for prior Diet approval might serve as an important brake on collective 
self-defense, but it could also be bypassed or foiled by government policymakers and JSDF 
operational demands.  The Law on Response to Contingencies states that postapproval is 
possible in “emergency” situations requiring immediate JSDF mobilization and dispatch.  Abe 
admitted in the Diet that postapproval situations were a possibility but described these as 
“exceptional” (reigai toshite kinkyū jigo shōnin o mitomete).58  In reality, though, many of the 
prime scenarios put forward by the government for the exercise of collective self-defense involve 
“emergency” responses. 
 For example, if Japan’s BMD systems are to work for the defense of U.S. maritime 
assets—one type of scenario identified by the coalition to justify the need for collective self-
defense—this can in practice require real-time responses to missile attacks.  Japanese 
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governments have already acknowledged this reality through revisions in the Defense Agency 
Law in 2005 delegating decisions on interceptor launches to the minister of defense or 
commanders in the field in accordance with preplanned scenarios.59  Indeed, Japan in August 
2016 in reaction to a North Korean missile test that it failed to detect the preparations for issued a 
three-month standing order for BMD intercepts to improve the JSDF’s state of readiness to 
respond instantly to threats.60  Japan might still have warning of a potential missile attack, as 
these types of scenario might emerge from gradually increasing regional military tensions 
necessitating the Diet to convene for security deliberations, and thus allowing for prior approval 
of the exercise of collective self-defense and BMD operations.  However, there remains the 
possibility that even in more managed situations, the outbreak of conflict and the rapid response 
of BMD systems, usually occurring within minutes, will place Japan on a trajectory of military 
action and collective self-defense.  This short timeframe will inhibit the ability of the Diet to 
provide prior approval and to control the escalation of responses in support of the United States. 
 Moreover, given the coalition’s own justifications for the need to enable the right of 
collective self-defense—centered on the argument that the speed and reach of modern weaponry 
can impact Japan’s own security even if it is not under direct attack—there is a probability that, 
under contemporary warfare conditions, conflict could still break out relatively rapidly and 
unexpectedly.  This type of conflict could draw Japanese security interests and JSDF defensive 
capabilities into a fast-moving, dynamic situation and require the exercise of collective self-
defense without prior Diet approval.  In addition, many suspect the Japanese government retains 
control of the definition of an “emergency” and could mold this for the purposes of bypassing 
prior Diet approval.  There has even been a suspicion that policymakers, newly equipped through 
the State Security Act of 2015 with strict powers controlling the flow of security data, could use 
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this to deprive the Diet of key information needed to deliberate on contingencies.  Government 
policymakers could thus use their informational advantage to prevent debates concerning prior 
approval and generally influence debates in favor of the exercise of collective self-defense.61 
 Lastly, on the issue of Diet constraints, it is apparent that, contrary to the claims of the 
Abe administration, there are in practice no meaningful additional obligations on the government 
to seek prior approval for JSDF participation in collective self-defense.  Abe’s trumpeting of the 
five-party agreement on prior Diet approval in September 2015 as further cementing democratic 
constraints on collective self-defense appears exaggerated.  The Law on Response to 
Contingencies, as already noted, contains explicit exemptions to the need for prior approval in 
the case of emergencies as defined by the government.  Moreover, the five-party agreement only 
requires prior approval for JSDF mobilization in cases when collective self-defense is not 
necessarily in response to an armed attack, such as dispatch to the Persian Gulf to counter an 
interruption to oil supplies, rather than the other scenarios outlined by the government.  The 
agreement does not, therefore, constrain the government’s principal objectives for collective self-
defense, even while it accepts that broader objectives such as dispatch to the Persian Gulf in 
response to economic threats are possible with prior Diet approval.  Furthermore, the five-party 
agreement is precisely that—an exclusive interparty agreement with absolutely no legal force.  
The LDP and New Kōmeitō entered into an agreement with partners then enjoying an upper 
house strength totaling seven members, who provided useful votes and extra party names to 
legitimize the security bills but hardly represented a major democratic mandate.  The constant 
process of splits and realignment among micro-parties means these three parties may well 
disappear and with them the force of the coalition; and indeed the combined upper house 
strength of these parties fell further to just five following the July 2016 election.  
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 If the LDP-New Kōmeitō with its working majorities in both houses of the Diet can 
largely decide on the exercise of collective self-defense, then the political reality may be that 
other decision making is increasingly stacked in favor of the governing parties and the executive.  
Most important, the LDP has demonstrated that it has now essentially freed the executive from 
the bureaucratic constraints imposed on security policy by the previously powerful CLB.  Since 
the early 1950s, the bureau has functioned to issue and safeguard interpretations of the 
constitution including the ban on the exercise of collective self-defense.  It has been the main 
guardian of constitutional interpretations in the postwar period in light of the Supreme Court’s 
position following the 1959 “Sunagawa Case” that “highly political matters” in security were not 
within the judiciary’s purview, abdicating these decisions to the government.62  Although the 
CLB’s influence was attacked by the LDP from the early 1990s onward, eventually enabling 
dispatch of the JSDF overseas on noncombat missions to the Indian Ocean and Iraq in the early 
2000s, it never conceded any de jure or even de facto breaches of the ban on the use of force and 
collective self-defense.63 
 Abe, though, has been successful in almost neutralizing the CLB.  He appointed Komatsu 
Ichirō, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official and former ambassador to France, to the position of 
director of the CLB in August 2013, making him the first director appointed from outside the 
CLB in its entire postwar history.  Komatsu was known as a proponent of collective self-defense 
having served during the first Abe administration on the secretariat for the first report of the 
Advisory Panel on the Reconstruction for the Legal Basis of Security.64  Komatsu suffered ill 
health during much of the process of revising the ban on collective self-defense and was replaced 
in May 2014 by Yokobatake Yūsuke, the deputy director of the CLB.  It was an internal 
promotion, but Yokobatake was seen as amenable to collective self-defense.65  He subsequently 
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appeared to toe the Abe administration’s line in Diet debates, and media investigations later 
revealed that the CLB had not maintained internal minutes of discussions on collective self-
defense, all suggestive of its pliant nature.66 
 With the CLB abandoning its traditional watchdog role, the locus of decision making on 
interpretations of the constitution shifted fully to the executive and came under political control.  
Rather than the government and CLB issuing a “unified government interpretation” as with 
many past adjustments to constitutional stances, Abe was largely able to bypass the CLB.  He 
effected constitutional reinterpretation through a combination of processes—the report of the 
Advisory Panel on the Reconstruction for the Legal Basis of Security, intracoalition negotiations, 
and the July 2014 Cabinet Decision—entirely controlled by the executive and the political 
parties.  The Abe administration has now established an unprecedented degree of executive 
control over constitutional interpretations largely impervious to other political and bureaucratic 
pressures.  The LDP and New Kōmeitō were able to override 60 years of prohibitions on 
collective self-defense in six weeks of intracoalition negotiations.  In turn, despite months of Diet 
deliberations and intense controversy, the coalition was able to pass all the initially proposed 
legislation without a single amendment—again hardly an endorsement of strong checks and 
balances on executive power over security policy.  All of this indicates that Abe has in no way 
boxed in his or future administrations politically over the exercise of collective self-defense.  On 
the contrary, Abe has only further lowered the legal, bureaucratic, and political barriers to 
facilitate its future exercise. 
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COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE ONLY A MATTER OF TIME? 
 The assertions of the Abe administration and other commentators that Japan’s moves to 
enable “limited” collective self-defense represent continuity, moderation, and the enhanced 
probability that it will not be exercised appear unconvincing when subjected to systematic 
scrutiny.  The first section of this article demonstrates that Japan faces an international structural 
and alliance context that has increasingly propelled it in the post–cold war period away from 
hedging behavior and toward more definite security commitments that necessitate collective self-
defense.  In turn, policymakers have come to accept and embed in national security policy the 
logic that Japan’s own security is indivisible from that of the United States, that collective self-
defense is consequently required, and that it is essential to design bilateral military frameworks 
facilitating the exercise of that right.  The second section demonstrates that the supposed 
strategic, legal, bureaucratic, and political constraints on collective self-defense articulated by the 
Abe administration are malleable and open to interpretation by the executive to the point of 
being near pretense.  In light of the powerful international and policymaking forces pushing for 
collective self-defense combined with weak domestic hadome to constrain its exercise, it 
becomes clear that there is not true continuity or moderation in revising the ban.  In actuality, 
Japan has opened up the potential for ready and radical usage of collective self-defense in future 
contingencies. 
 In the short term, residual strategic differences and hedging behavior toward the United 
States as well as immediate domestic political expediency may lend conviction to the arguments 
that Japan will not seek to exercise collective self-defense.  The alliance partners still do not have 
absolute strategic converegence.  The United States has tended to focus on bilateral cooperation 
for regional and global contingencies, whereas Japan has been more preoccupied with Japan-
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related contingencies, especially in the East China Sea.  Under the revised Guidelines for U.S.-
Japan Defense Cooperation, Japan is the first responder in any Senkaku contingency.  Japanese 
policymakers still harbor concerns over entrapment in U.S.-led contingencies out of area, while 
the United States remains concerned about its own entrapment in Japan’s territorial disputes.  
Both powers are therefore wary about fulfilling their mutual collective self-defense obligations. 
 Moreover, Abe and the LDP are still mindful that both the coalition and public opinion 
must be handled with care if political stability is to be maintained.  The coalition appears to be a 
fixed feature of the Japanese political scene for the foreseeable future, though the LDP will 
constantly need to negotiate the boundaries of collective self-defense with the New Kōmeitō.  
This may not prove to be a major block for exercising the right of collective self-defense.  The 
LDP has in the past consistently managed to persuade the New Kōmeitō to compromise its 
pacifist principles on security policy as with the 1992 IPCL, the 1999 Regional Contingencies 
Law, and the dispatch of JSDF to Iraq in 2003.  It pulled off a similar feat in revising the ban on 
collective self-defense in 2014–15.  Despite the intense controversy surrounding the legislation, 
the coalition proved rock solid on security issues, and the LDP seems likely to maintain the 
support of the New Kōmeitō, even in a contingency situation, through various side payments in 
policies on welfare and taxation.  Meanwhile, Japan’s opposition parties have proved largely 
incapable of impeding the LDP’s security agenda on collective self-defense.  Even when the 
security legislation functioned as a rallying point to unify all opposition parties in summer 2015, 
they were unable to prevent or even amend the legislation.  The ability of the newly created 
Democratic Party to provide effective opposition is just as questionable given its own diversity 
of internal positions on collective self-defense. 
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 As for public opinion, Abe and the LDP are in the short term likely to continue their 
tactics of “bait and switch” over security policy change.67  Abe pursued this pattern in pushing 
through collective self-defense: releasing the Cabinet Decision in July 2014; then pausing 
activity on security policy to focus on electorally popular economic issues for the December 
2014 lower house election; then, once the election was won and political control assured, 
switching back to the security legislation in summer 2015.  Abe returned mainly to economic 
issues before the July 2016 upper house elections, and the pace of security change slowed.  The 
JSDF appears to have been held back in 2016 from fully engaging in military exercises that 
might suggest rehearsals for collective self-defense.68  It is clear, though, that the appetite of Abe 
and the LDP for radical security reform remains unabated.  After the 2016 election, and the 
further strengthening of coalition control in the upper and lower houses, the LDP continues to 
plan to seek not just collective self-defense but now formal constitutional revision.  The LDP has 
the political nous to continue to push through controversial security policies and successfully 
circumvent public opinion.  Moreover, as noted earlier, although public opinion has not approved 
of Abe’s methods, it is equally divided over the necessity of the legislation..  There is a 
significant body of public opinion less opposed to collective self-defense.  All of this signals the 
likely ability of the LDP to persuade the public to acquiesce in the exercise of collective self-
defense in the future. 
 Consequently, Abe and the LDP have successfully wedged open the door for collective 
self-defense for the short term and have the ability to fling it open wider over the longer term if 
demanded by a security contingency and the U.S.-Japan alliance.  LDP-New Kōmeitō attempts 
to portray the shift to collective self-defense as continuity, if critically examined on their own 
terms, fail to convince.  Japan has embarked on a genuinely radical trajectory in security policy.  
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Its new security path may be welcome to many but it is important to recognize, free of coalition 
obfuscation, that it does indeed mark a sharp break with the antimilitaristic principles of the past.  
Japan is emerging through collective self-defense as a more committed strategic and military 
partner of the United States in the “rebalance.”  As part of its decreased hedging and adherence 
to the U.S.-Japan alliance through collective self-defense, Japan risks the further escalation of 
security tensions with China and North Korea.  It is increasingly likely to participate and to offer 
the use of force in regional contingencies in the East China Sea, the Korean Peninsula, and even 
perhaps in the South China Sea and beyond, to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.  This is hardly 
the stuff of essential continuity and necessitates consideration of Japan as a far more serious 
military player in international security. 
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